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ABSTRACT 
Information processing biases, such as interpretation bias and attention bias, play a 
significant role in social anxiety disorder (Williams et al., 1997). Interpretation bias refers to the 
tendency to interpret both negative and neutral stimuli as more negative than they are 
objectively. Attention bias refers to the tendency to attend preferentially to threatening stimuli.  
Socially anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias for ambiguous social stimuli 
(e.g., social scenarios) (for review see, Amir & Bomyea, 2010). In addition, socially anxious 
individuals exhibit a bias to orient attention either towards or away from threatening social 
stimuli (e.g., facial expressions; see Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Whereas an extensive body of 
research focuses on both interpretation bias and attention bias in social anxiety in isolation, very 
few studies have concurrently examined the associations between these two biases and social 
anxiety symptoms and evaluated their distinct predictive power. Further, no studies have 
examined their relation to behavioral avoidance, which is a key symptom of social anxiety that 
directly contributes to clinical severity (Kazdin, 1999).  
The current study examined how interpretation and attention biases independently relate 
to symptomology, situational anxiety, and behavior in adults diagnosed with social anxiety 
disorder. Thirty-four participants diagnosed with social anxiety completed computerized 
interpretation bias and attention bias tasks, a behavioral avoidance speech task, and self-report 
measures of state and trait social anxiety and general state anxiety. Results indicated that a 
negative interpretation bias was significantly related to state and trait social anxiety and a lack of 
benign interpretation bias was related to general state anxiety. There were no associations 
between attention bias and anxiety or behavior. Findings highlight the unique importance of both 
negative and benign interpretation biases in social phobia. Suggestions for future research 
include incorporating benign interpretation training, particularly under stress, into treatment 
programs such as cognitive modification or exposure therapy for social phobia. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Overview of social anxiety 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is characterized by persistent and exaggerated fear and 
apprehension of social or performance situations involving possible negative evaluations by 
others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Individuals with SAD experience anxiety in, 
and avoid, socially evaluative situations such as conversations, speaking with authorities, public 
speaking, asserting themselves, and attending social events.  Between 10-13% of the general 
United States (US) population have SAD, making it the fourth most prevalent psychological 
disorder (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996) and the second most common 
anxiety disorder in the US (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005).  SAD is debilitating– 
individuals with SAD attain lower levels of educational achievement and earn less income; they 
are also less likely to be married than their less anxious peers (Turner & Beidel, 1988).  More 
individuals with SAD fail to receive treatment than do individuals with other major psychiatric 
disorders, and between 72% and 95% of individuals diagnosed report never having received 
mental health treatment (Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992).  Individuals 
with social phobia participating in National Anxiety Disorders Screening Day indicated that the 
most common barriers to treatment were uncertainty over where to go for treatment, inability to 
afford services, and fear of what others might think if they sought help (Olfson et al., 2000). 
1.2 Information processing biases in anxiety  
Theoretical models of anxiety suggest that information processing biases (also referred to 
as cognitive or cognitive processing biases) are crucial factors in the etiology, maintenance, and 
treatment process of anxiety disorders, including SAD (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005; 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Williams, Watts, 
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MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). These biases involve the preferential or selective processing of 
information: in the context of anxiety, information processing biases are specific to threat-
relevant stimuli.  Experimental psychopathologists have examined information processing biases 
within three domains: attention, memory, and interpretation.  These biases can manifest at two 
stages of information processing: automatic and strategic.  Automatic processing is effortless, 
involuntary, and unintentional, whereas strategic or controlled processing is considered effortful, 
voluntary, and intentional (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).   
Information processing models of anxiety typically treat attention to and interpretation of 
threat cues as two distinct processes that unfold sequentially.  In general, these models posit that 
threat identification (first at the automatic and second at the strategic stage) leads to allocation of 
attention toward threatening stimuli (at both the automatic and strategic stages) (Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998).  People with pathological anxiety overestimate the 
threat value of information and allocate excessive attention toward processing the information 
that they have perceived as threat-relevant.  The current study focuses on these two processing 
biases—interpretation and attention—in SAD. 
1.3 Interpretation bias in social anxiety disorder 
Interpretation biases lead anxious individuals to interpret ambiguous situations in a 
negative manner (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 2005).  Cognitive models of social anxiety 
maintain that socially anxious individuals interpret interpersonal cues or evaluative feedback in 
social situations, which are characteristically ambiguous, in a negative way (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  A number of studies reveal a significant association between 
social anxiety and interpretation bias (for review see, Amir & Bomyea, 2010) and show that 
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socially anxious individuals interpret negative and ambiguous stimuli (e.g., social situations) 
presented in the context of a variety of tasks more negatively than do non-anxious individuals.  
Two studies have used questionnaire measures that comprise ambiguous social and non-
social scenarios and verbal scripts to investigate interpretation bias in socially anxious samples 
(Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000).  These questionnaires require participants to 
read ambiguous nonsocial (e.g., “You get your cable bill and notice that . . .”) and social 
scenarios (e.g., “Someone you are interested in says 'Hello' to you), each followed by three 
possible interpretations:  positive (e.g., “S/he wants to get to know you”), negative (e.g., “S/he 
feels sorry for you”), and neutral (e.g., “S/he says ‘Hello’ to everyone”).  Participants rank order 
the interpretations according to how likely they think each would come to mind, or they rate 
which interpretation they believe more.  Results from these two studies indicated that in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations, socially anxious individuals endorsed negative 
interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios as more readily accessible and more believable, 
even when neutral and positive interpretations were available, than did less socially anxious 
individuals.   
Other studies have used visual stimuli, including images of facial expressions (Lira Yoon 
& Zinbarg, 2007; Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 1995) and video clips (Amir, Beard, & Bower, 
2005), to measure interpretation bias in social anxiety, based in part on the idea that such stimuli, 
which participants routinely encounter in day-to-day social life, may be more ecologically valid  
(Risko, Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2012).  In a study with a small non-clinical 
sample (N=24) of individuals scoring high (n=13) or low (n=11) on the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation (FNE) scale, participants in the high-FNE group labeled the affect displayed on both 
negative (e.g., anger, sadness, disgust, fear) and neutral facial expressions as negative more often 
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than did low-FNE subjects after members of both groups were told they might be chosen to give 
a speech (Winton et al., 1995).  In another study of non-clinical undergraduate participants, 
individuals who were more socially anxious interpreted neutral facial expressions as more 
threatening than did those who were less anxious, both when they were shown different types of 
facial expressions and asked to label the emotions as positive, negative, neutral, bored or other 
and when they were asked to tell stories about the pictures (e.g., “He was angry that he got a 
lower grade than her.”) (Lira Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007).   
Amir and colleagues (2005) examined the specificity of a negative interpretation bias to 
social anxiety by comparing valence ratings (e.g., “very negative emotion” to “very positive 
emotion”) of video clips of positive (e.g., “I really like your shoes), negative (e.g., “That is a 
horrible hair cut”) and ambiguous (e.g., “That is an interesting shirt you have on”) statements 
across socially anxious, anxious-dysphoric (i.e., trait anxious and depressed but not social 
anxious), and non-anxious groups.  In a sample of 75 undergraduates, participants were divided 
into groups based on percentile scores on continuous measures of social anxiety and depression 
(non-anxious controls scored in the bottom 15 percent on both measures, whereas the socially 
anxious group scored higher on social anxiety measures than did the anxious-dysphoric group).  
Results showed that the socially anxious group rated the ambiguous video clips as significantly 
more negative (using a 7-point Likert rating scale) than did both non-anxious and anxious-
dysphoric groups.  In sum, studies using various stimulus types and methodologies suggest that 
socially anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias.   
Although the studies described above yielded findings consistent with the hypothesis that 
there is an association between interpretation bias and social anxiety, their methodologies 
revolve around self-reported perceptions of stimuli, which may be subject to multiple layers of 
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bias. Direct performance-based measures may yield more accurate estimates of interpretation 
bias, because they assess the biased process itself rather than individuals’ perceptions of their 
bias. Interpretive processes are thought to occur quickly; individuals may even be unaware that 
the processes are occurring (Rozenman, Amir, & Weersing, 2014).  Self-report measures require 
the use of higher level processing that may not reflect automatic interpretation; these measures 
also may preferentially elicit desirability-based responses (e.g., "responding the way one thinks 
he or she should") (Rozenman et al., 2014).  A measure that provides a more direct evaluation of 
interpretation bias than self-report measures may yield more accurate and more real-world 
consistent estimates.  
Beard and Amir developed the Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & 
Amir, 2008) as a more direct measure of interpretation bias.  During administration of this 
computerized measure, participants view threatening (e.g., “weird” or “warning”) and non-
threatening words (e.g., “cool” and “awake”) followed by social (e.g., “Someone looks at you as 
you walk by”) and non-social sentences (e.g., “The alarm goes off”).  Participants are then asked 
to indicate whether the word and sentence are related or not.  The rationale behind the task is to 
target an online and unconscious measure of interpretation by asking participants to make a short 
evaluation of seemingly irrelevant content (e.g., subjects are not being asked to trigger their own 
bias by imagining being in a situation; rather, they are simply responding to sentences and 
words).  Beard and Amir (2008) found that social anxiety correlated negatively with non-
threatening endorsement (i.e., indicating that a neutral word and a social sentence pair were 
related) and positively with threatening endorsement (i.e., indicating that a threat word and a 
social sentence pair were related) in two samples, one undergraduate sample and one sample of 
people scoring high on a measure of social anxiety.  In other words, individuals with higher 
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levels of social anxiety more often endorsed non-threatening word-sentence pairs as non-related 
and threatening pairs as related than did individuals with lower levels of anxiety, leading the 
authors to conclude that socially anxious individuals display a negative interpretation bias.  
Researchers have also experimentally manipulated socially anxious individuals’ 
interpretation biases by training individuals to interpret social stimuli in a certain way by 
rewarding non-threatening interpretations more often than threatening ones, in order to induce a 
benign interpretation bias.  For example, in such an interpretation modification paradigm, a 
“Correct!” message might appear after an individual indicates that a sentence and neutral word 
are related.  Murphy and colleagues (2007) found that after one session of interpretation 
modification, socially anxious participants who received a benign interpretation induction 
reported feeling less anxious about a future social situation than did socially anxious participants 
who received no interpretation manipulation.  Beard and Amir (2008) found that after eight 
sessions of interpretation modification or no modification (i.e., participants complete the task 
without any feedback), participants who completed the benign induction modification generated 
fewer threat interpretations and more benign interpretations and also endorsed fewer social 
anxiety symptoms than participants in the no modification condition.  They interpreted their 
results as indicating that changes in interpretation patterns mediated the program’s effect on 
social anxiety, because increases in benign interpretation correlated with decreases in social 
anxiety symptoms.  
Empirical data indicate that socially anxious individuals exhibit a negative interpretat ion 
bias for verbal and non-verbal stimuli, as measured by self-report questionnaires and by direct 
assessment of performance on an interpretation task.  What is still unknown is whether 
interpretation bias is related to behavioral avoidance in individuals with SAD.  This question is 
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important to address, because behavioral avoidance is a significant and impairing symptom of 
the disorder. If interpretation bias is related to behavioral avoidance, then perhaps modifying bias 
as a form of treatment could provide an alternative to gold standards of treatment, such as 
exposure therapy, that is more accessible (requiring access only to a computer versus to a trained 
clinician). 
1.4 Attention bias in social anxiety disorder 
The relation between behavioral avoidance and attention bias also has yet to be studied. 
General cognitive models of anxiety posit that anxious individuals display an attention bias; in 
other words, they preferentially attend to threatening stimuli (e.g., Eysenck & Derakshan, 1997; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997).  Prominent cognitive models of social anxiety 
have linked attention bias to the maintenance and development of social phobia.  Interestingly, 
however, whereas one cognitive model of social anxiety proposes an attention bias, or vigilance, 
toward socially threatening stimuli external to the person (such as a frowning face (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997), another posits that social anxiety is characterized by self-focused attention 
(Clark & Wells, 1995), which implies that affected individuals will display an attention bias 
away from, or avoidance of, threatening stimuli in the external environment. In their model, 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) propose that socially anxious individuals scan their environments 
for threatening cues (e.g., signs of negative evaluation) and have difficulty disengaging attention 
from them.  Clark and Wells (1995), on the other hand, propose that during socially threatening 
situations socially anxious individuals avoid external cues, turn their attention inward, and 
become self-focused, attending preferentially to internal cues for information (e.g., "My face 
feels flushed, other people know I am nervous").  According to this model, socially anxious 
individuals miss signals regarding the persistence of threat or markers of safety from the 
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environment because they are focused on the internal experiences of anxiety.  To address these 
competing models, Schultz and Heimberg (2008) conducted a review of the literature and 
concluded that while current research lacks direct investigation of these models (e.g., we do not 
know if participants are self-focused if they avoid external cues), it is likely that socially anxious 
individuals attend to both external and internal cues throughout the course of a social situation. 
 Most studies have used dot probe tasks to measure attention bias (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986).  In a typical dot probe task, participants are first presented with a 
fixation marker (e.g. a “+” sign) in the middle of a computer screen, followed by a pair of words 
presented either horizontally (one next to the other) or vertically (one directly above the other).  
On critical trials, one of the words in the pair is neutral (e.g., "table") and the other is threatening 
(e.g., "humiliation"). Other trials may consist of two neutral words or one positive and one 
neutral word.  Each pair of words appears on the screen for a brief duration, usually in the range 
of 500 to 1500 milliseconds.  Immediately following the word pair, a probe (a dot or an asterisk) 
appears in the location of one of the words from the pair.  Participants must then press one of two 
buttons on a keyboard to identify the location of the probe (left versus right or top versus bottom) 
on the screen.  The probe stimulus that participants respond more quickly to is assumed to be the 
region of display (threatening or neutral) preferentially attended to.  Therefore faster response 
times to probes behind the threatening words relative to the non-threatening words reflect a bias 
toward threat (vigilance), and slower response times indicate a bias away from threat 
(avoidance).  
Recent research on attention bias in socially anxious individuals has used a modified 
version of the dot probe task that incorporates emotional facial stimuli rather than social verbal 
stimuli, based on the idea that expressive faces should constitute more salient stimuli than do 
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words in a social interaction (Planalp, De Francisco, & Rutherford, 1996). In the modified 
version of the task, individuals view neutral faces paired with happy, threatening, or neutral 
faces.  Researchers have argued that the modified dot probe task is a more ecologically valid 
measure of attention bias in social phobia than the original dot probe task, because facial 
expressions are a major source of information in social situations  (Planalp et al., 1996).  
Studies using dot probe tasks to measure attentional bias within non-clinical and clinical 
populations of socially anxious people have variously found evidence of a vigilant bias (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004; Sposari & 
Rapee, 2007), an avoidant bias (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & 
Chen, 1999), and an absence of any significant bias (Bradley et al., 1997; Pineless & Mineka, 
2005).  For example, in clinical samples of socially anxious individuals, Sposari and Rapee 
(2007) found a vigilant attention bias for social threat stimuli, while Chen et al. (2002) found an 
avoidant attention bias for socially threatening stimuli.  Both studies used the modified dot probe 
task described above and included the same number of trials with stimuli presented for the same 
duration of time.  
Another study of individuals with social phobia suggest that they may in fact display one 
of two distinct subtypes of attention bias – vigilant and avoidant—that differentially respond to 
treatment (Calamaras, Tone, & Anderson, 2012).  In a sample of 24 socially phobic adults, 
Calamaras and colleagues (2012) found that participants displayed either attentional vigilance for 
threat (62%) or attentional avoidance (38%) prior to treatment, and that these distinct groups 
showed different patterns of attentional change following treatment -  the vigilant group became 
less vigilant and the avoidant group became less avoidant and even slightly vigilant.   
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Research has also examined the manipulability of attention biases by either inducing an 
attention bias to increase social anxiety (Heeren, Peschard, & Philippot, 2012) or by using 
attention retraining paradigms as a treatment method for SAD (Amir et al., 2009).  In attention 
retraining paradigms, the probe is placed behind the neutral face rather than the threat face the 
majority of the time, with the aim of reducing attention to threatening stimuli and decreasing 
anxiety symptoms in an anxious individual (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Bunnell, Beidel, & Mesa, 
2013; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009).  Initially, studies supported attention 
retraining as a means to reduce social anxiety; people with social anxiety randomly assigned to 
attention retraining reported less social anxiety.  Two randomized-controlled studies, which used 
the same attention retraining procedures and equal numbers of sessions, found significant 
differences in post-treatment anxiety levels between social phobics who received attention 
retraining and those who completed a control version of the task (Amir et al., 2009 and Schmidt 
et al., 2009).  Gains in the retraining groups were maintained four months later.  Both studies 
utilized clinician-administered (blinded to treatment condition) and self-report measures of 
anxiety, including the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) and the Social Phobia and 
Anxiety Inventory (SPAI).  Interestingly, Schmidt and colleagues (2009) found no significant 
differences between retraining and control groups on self-report measures at post treatment (only 
clinician administered ones); however, there were significant differences at the 4-month follow-
up across all measures.  In both studies, greater proportions of participants in the retraining group 
(50% and 72%) no longer met DSM criteria for SAD compared to the control groups (14% and 
11%) after treatment.  
Recent randomized controlled trials of attention retraining interventions have failed to 
replicate the initial positive results (e.g., Bunnell et al., 2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; Neubauer et 
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al., 2013).  For example, using the same procedures within a sample (N=31) that was comparable 
to those enrolled in the Amir et al. (2009) and Schmidt et al. (2009) studies, Bunnell and 
colleagues (2013) found no post-treatment differences between groups on both clinician-
administered and self-report measures of anxiety after treatment.  Similarly, randomized-
controlled studies examining internet-delivered attention retraining have revealed null findings 
using self-report measures of social anxiety (Carlbring et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013).  
While it is unclear why subsequent studies have failed to replicate the initial positive findings 
regarding attention retraining and its effects, it is clear that future research is warranted—
particularly research that includes assessments of behavior in addition to self and clinician rated 
measures (Hereen et al., 2015). 
1.5 The relation between cognition and behavior  
Cognitive behavioral models of anxiety describe theoretical relations among anxiety-
relevant thoughts (e.g., cognitive biases), feelings (e.g., anxiety), and behavior (e.g., escape or 
avoidance).  These models suggest that thoughts (e.g., "This situation is scary") related to a 
stimulus (e.g., "a party") likely evoke or perpetuate an emotion (e.g., anxiety) that guides specific 
behavior (e.g., "only socialize with friends or don’t attend").  According to classic fear response 
models, anxiety engenders one of two behavioral responses: flight (flee the situation) or fight 
(prepare to defend oneself) (Cannon, 1929; McFarland, 1981).  In most social situations, a 
socially phobic individual is likely to respond with a flight response or behavioral avoidance; in 
other words, the individual will typically leave or elect not to enter the situation (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Cognitive behavioral models of anxiety suggest that maladaptive cognitions lead to 
increased anxiety and behavioral avoidance (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).  
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Therefore, cognitive-behavioral theorists propose that a cognitive bias—involving attention or 
interpretation—activated when a person is faced with a feared situation leads that individual to 
experience anxiety and to engage in behavioral avoidance (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  For 
example, a socially anxious individual who is giving a speech may seek out and attend to 
negative facial expressions (e.g., bored) to confirm her belief that she is performing poorly.  Her 
negative interpretation of the audience’s expressions, which leads her to continue to attend to 
them, increases her anxiety and discomfort.  This distress, in turn, leads her to cut her speech 
short in order to get off of the stage (behavioral avoidance).  When she thinks about her 
experience in this situation, she is likely to avoid similar situations in the future because she does 
not want to experience the same distress.  Behavioral avoidance is critical in the maintenance of 
anxiety disorders, particularly social anxiety, because by avoiding objectively safe social 
situations, socially anxious individuals miss opportunities to learn that situations that they find 
anxiety-provoking will not necessarily result in rejection or other negative consequences.  This 
lack of learning opportunities, in turn, leaves them unable to recalibrate their anxiety response.  
Behavioral avoidance leads to a narrowing of an individual’s life experiences.  
Consequently, it is associated with significant functional impairment—avoidant individuals 
restrict themselves to only experiencing situations that do not induce anxiety (e.g. staying home), 
and thus they miss out on numerous other potentially rewarding experiences (e.g., meeting new 
people) and fail to engage in necessary activities for life (e.g., having a job) (Ledley et al., 2008).  
Further, because avoidant individuals deny themselves opportunities to learn that feared 
consequences of more varied experiences are unlikely, they are prone to remain anxious about 
those experiences.   
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Because behavioral avoidance is thus thought to contribute to the maintenance of social 
anxiety disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), current gold standard treatment 
models are built around exposure paradigms.  These paradigms require anxious individuals to 
face feared situations in order to extinguish their exaggerated fear responses (Feske & 
Chambless, 1995; Hope, Heimberg, & Bruch, 1995).  Exposure therapy leads to reduced 
symptoms of distress and avoidance measured by self-report questionnaires and behavioral 
laboratory tasks (e.g., giving an impromptu speech) (Taylor et al., 1996; Gould et al., 1997).  
Exposure therapy has also been shown to result in reduced cognitive biases (e.g., reduced 
negative thoughts relating to a social situation or reduced fears of negative evaluation) in social 
anxiety (Newman, Hofmann, Trabert, Roth, & Taylor, 1994).  
Very little research has examined relations between information processing biases and 
behavior in social anxiety.  One study examined the effects of attention retraining on behavioral 
outcomes including length of eye contact, time spent speaking, and whether participants ended 
the conversation or discontinued speaking early (escape) in a clinical sample, and found no 
significant differences at post treatment between the retraining condition and the control group 
(Bunnell et al., 2012).  Lange and colleagues (2010) manipulated interpretation bias in a sample 
of participants who scored in the average range on an anxiety measure.   Specifically, they 
induced a positive or negative interpretation bias using a task in which participants completed 
socially ambiguous vignettes by filling in the missing letter of the last word, resulting in either a 
positive or negative scene.  Results showed no differences in what the authors termed “reflexive 
anxious behavior” (e.g., moving away from faces in a crowd) between those who were trained to 
interpret social situations negatively and those in the positive training condition.  Notably, the 
researchers used a sample of individuals with average levels of anxiety; members of such a 
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sample may respond differently than do people in a clinical sample. Interestingly, neither 
Bunnell et al. (2012) nor Lange et al. (2010) looked at whether attention or interpretation bias 
scores were related to anxious behavior.  Examining relations among cognitive biases and actual 
behavior would add further value by providing a more ecologically valid assessment of “real-
world” functional impairment and help to inform newly developing treatments targeting bias 
modification (Kazdin, 1999). 
1.6 Examining interpretation bias and attention bias together 
Cognitive models of social anxiety propose that information processing biases, such as 
interpretation bias and attention bias, interact with one another to affect social anxiety and 
maladaptive behavior, and that cognitive and behavioral processes may influence one another in 
various ways (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006).  For example, negatively interpreting a stimulus 
is likely to lead a socially anxious individual to further allocate attention towards the stimulus 
(e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997).  Conversely, preferential attention to a negative stimulus may 
facilitate negative interpretations of negative, neutral, or even positive stimuli because in order to 
evaluate a stimulus, one must perceive and attend to it first.  Researchers highlight the need for 
further empirical data examining multiple biases simultaneously, as most of the body of literature 
on cognitive biases in anxiety, and specifically social anxiety, have examined these processes 
only in isolation (Hirsch et al., 2006).  One question that needs examination is whether 
interpretation bias and attention bias may be differentially related to distress levels and behavior 
in social anxiety.  For example, negative interpretation of stimuli could lead an individual to flee 
a situation, while excessive attention to negative stimuli results in heightened anxiety.  It is also 
plausible that both types of bias may make equal contributions to symptomology.  Theoretical 
models propose that these biases are unique components of information processing that together 
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influence anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997); however, research has 
yet to determine whether they have distinct effects on symptom severity and/or behavior.  
To date, two studies have examined attention and interpretation biases simultaneously in 
anxious individuals (Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & Mackintosh, 2011; Beard, Wiesberg, 
& Amir, 2011).   Brosan and colleagues (2011) examined the efficacy of combined cognitive 
bias modification (CBM) for attention and interpretation biases (i.e., participants completed an 
attention retraining program and an interpretation bias modification program) for decreasing both 
state and trait anxiety in a small outpatient sample of 12 individuals diagnosed with social 
anxiety or generalized anxiety.  Results indicated that after four weeks of both attention and 
interpretation retraining, patients showed reductions in attention for threat and negative 
interpretation bias, as well as reductions in trait and state anxiety.  Beard and colleagues (2011) 
conducted a randomized-controlled trial to examine the efficacy of combined CBM in a sample 
of 34 individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder. Results indicated that after 8 weeks of 
combined CBM, participants receiving CBM had significantly reduced self-reported symptoms 
of social anxiety and improved performance on an impromptu speech compared to the placebo 
group. Thus, these results suggest that targeting both biases in combination results in reduced 
state and trait anxiety; however, whether this effect is driven by one type of training more than 
the other is unknown.   
The findings’ of the above studies are difficult to evaluate because of many 
methodological limitations.  Because the study was conducted within a routine clinical practice, 
standardized research diagnostic measures were not used.  Instead, clinical or counseling 
psychologists identified the presence or absence of primary anxiety problems using semi-
structured assessments that covered the main symptoms of disorders based on DSM-IV criteria.  
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The authors did not report what proportion of the sample endorsed problems associated primarily 
with social anxiety versus generalized anxiety.  Therefore, it could not be determined whether 
the results were driven primarily by the generalized anxiety participants or by the social anxiety 
participants.  Additionally, the authors did not specify which type of training (attention or 
interpretation) was more strongly associated with symptom reduction, nor did they report 
whether either bias related to anxiety severity at baseline.  Further, only five of the participants 
had clinically significant changes in anxiety levels after treatment.  Finally, the study did not 
include a behavioral measure of anxiety, which Kazdin (1999) contends can provide a more valid 
measure of “real-world” functioning and assessment of the clinical significance of a 
psychological disorder.  Therefore, associations among attention bias, interpretation bias, and 
baseline anxiety or behavior remain unclear, as does the degree to which each contributes to 
anxious symptomology.  
While there is a lack of published studies that offer direct evidence, the current literature 
could suggest that interpretation bias may be more directly related to anxiety symptomology and 
behavioral avoidance for several reasons.  First, information processing models of anxiety 
specifically suggest that overestimation of the threat posed by benign stimuli is the main problem 
that needs to be addressed in the treatment of anxiety disorders (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985).  Furthermore, in theory, interpretation guides further allocation of attention for 
processing, such that if a stimulus is evaluated as threatening, further attention will be given to 
that stimulus.   Therefore, if a person does not interpret a stimulus as threatening, that person is 
unlikely to attend to it further.  Consequently, the person may not generate negative 
interpretations of the stimulus that influence behavior.  For example, if a person does not 
perceive an audience to be negatively evaluating him, any anxiety that he feels about his 
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performance will likely decrease and he will not be motivated to engage in avoidant behavior, 
such as cutting his speech short.    
Second, evidence for the positive relation between interpretation bias and social anxiety 
symptoms is robust across numerous studies of varied methodology, including some that 
employed experimental designs (Murphy et al., 2007; Beard 2008).  In contrast, the literature on 
attention bias and social anxiety is variable, with some studies finding no evidence for an 
attention bias in social phobia (Bradley et al., 1997; Pineless & Mineka, 2005).  In addition, 
literature supports the idea that reducing negative interpretations is related to reduced anxiety, 
while the attention bias retraining literature is not promising (e.g., Bunnell et al., 2013; Carlbring 
et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013).  Finally, anecdotal comments from participants in treatment 
studies suggest that people find interpretation bias retraining to be more beneficial than attention 
retraining.  In their combined cognitive bias treatment study, Brosan and colleagues (2011) 
reported that patients described the attention retraining task as boring, and the interpretation bias 
task as helpful in “getting you to alter your perception and realize there are a different ways of 
seeing things” (p. 262).   
1.7 Justification and hypotheses 
The current study aimed to add to the literature on cognitive processes in social anxiety 
by examining relations among interpretation bias, attention bias, symptom severity, and both 
behavior and self-reported situational anxiety during a socially threatening situation.  The current 
study also aimed to examine whether interpretation bias and/or attention bias are distinct 
predictors of anxiety and behavior in a clinical sample of socially anxious individuals.  I 
hypothesized that both attention bias and interpretation bias would relate significantly to 
behavior, as measured by speech length during a laboratory impromptu speech task, which is 
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commonly associated with higher levels of anxiety (Beidel, Turner, Jacob, & Cooley, 1989) and 
self-reported anxiety during and immediately after the task.  I also hypothesized that 
interpretation bias would be a stronger predictor of both anxiety levels and behavioral avoidance.   
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2     EXPERIMENT 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 34 English-speaking individuals with a primary diagnosis of social 
anxiety disorder, as assessed by the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002).  Participants were recruited through advertisements (e.g., 
newspaper, Internet, flyers), referrals from local clinicians, and the Georgia State University 
SONA undergraduate psychology research participant pool.  Participants on psychoactive 
medication were required to be stabilized on their current medication(s) and dosage(s) for at least 
3 months and to remain at the stabilized dosage throughout the course of the study.  Individuals 
meeting any of the following criteria were excluded: history of mania or psychoses, recent 
suicidal ideation (within the past 3 months), and/or current alcohol or substance abuse or 
dependence.   
The sample was mostly female (65%) with a mean age of 23 (SD= 6.07).  Half of the 
same identified as Black/African American, about a third as White/Caucasian (29%), less than a 
quarter as Asian American (14%) and the rest as Hispanic (6%).  The majority of the sample was 
single (91%) and the rest described themselves as living with someone (8%).  The sample 
comprised mostly college students (65%) and the median total annual household income was 
$10,000-20,000.  
2.2 Measures 
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 2002).  The SCID is a 
structured, well-validated diagnostic clinical interview used to assess psychological disorders 
based upon DSM-IV criteria.  Several studies (Basco et al., 2000; Kranzler, Kadden, Babor, 
Tennen, & Rounsaville, 1996) have demonstrated superior diagnostic validity of the SCID over 
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standard clinical interviews at intake, particularly for Axis I disorders (Lobbestael, Leurgans, & 
Arntz, 2011).  For the current project, the SCID was used to establish whether potential 
participants meet the inclusion criterion of a diagnosis of social phobia, as well as whether they 
demonstrate presence of co-morbid Axis I conditions within the mood, alcohol/substance use, 
and anxiety disorders modules.  
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale– Self Report Version (LSAS-SR; Liebowitz, 1987).  The 
LSAS-SR, a 24-item self-report instrument assessing fear and avoidance across a variety of 
social interactions and performance situations, was used to assess symptom severity.  The 
measure is appropriate to complete electronically (Hedman et al., 2010).  Participants used a 
Likert-type scale to provide ratings of fear (0 = none, 1 = mild, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe) and 
avoidance (0 = never, 1 = occasionally, 2 = often, 3 = usually) for each item.  Higher total scores 
on the fear and avoidance subscales, respectively, indicate greater anxiety and avoidance.  Total 
scores on each scale (fear and avoidance) served as dependent variables.  
The LSAS-SR has demonstrated high internal consistency among clinically socially 
anxious individuals (α = .95) as well as among individuals without an Axis I disorder (α = .94), 
and it appears to have strong convergent and discriminant validity (Fresco et al., 2001).  
Furthermore, responses and scores obtained using the LSAS-SR have not been found to differ 
from those obtained using a clinician-administered version of the LSAS, and subscale 
intercorrelations for the two forms are extremely similar (Fresco et al., 2001).  Normative data 
for a sample of 382 patients diagnosed with social phobia yielded a mean fear score of 35.5 (SD 
= 13.6), and a mean avoidance score of 31.6 (SD = 14.5) (Heimberg et al., 1999).  In the current 
study, both scales—fear and avoidance—showed excellent reliability, with Cronbach alphas of 
.97 and .96, respectively.  
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Word Sentence Association Paradigm (WSAP; Beard & Amir, 2008).  The WSAP, a 
computerized task used to assess interpretation bias in social anxiety, served as the measure of 
interpretation bias.  Prior to starting the task, participants reviewed instructions on the computer 
screen with the assessor.  The task consisted of four steps.  First, a fixation cross, used to direct 
participants’ attention towards the middle of the screen and alert them that a trial is beginning, 
appeared on the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms).  Second, a word representing either a threat 
interpretation (e.g., “embarrassing”) or a non-threat interpretation (e.g., “funny”) appeared in the 
center of the screen for 500 ms.  Next, an ambiguous sentence (e.g., “People laugh after 
something you said”) appeared on the screen until the participant pressed the space bar to 
indicate that he or she had finished reading it.  Finally, the prompt “Are they related?” appeared 
on the screen.  Participants pressed “#1” on the keypad if the word and sentence appeared to be 
related, and “#3” on the keypad if they did not appear to be related.  
Participants completed 110 trials of the WSAP.  Seventy-six trials included sentences 
with social themes and 34 trials were non-social filler sentences (e.g., “A loud noise is heard at 
night”).  All text appeared in black font against a gray background.  For each participant, I 
calculated the proportion of threat interpretation trials and benign interpretation trials endorsed 
out of the total number of respective trials presented.  Endorsed trials are those in which the word 
and sentence are identified as related.  The percentage of threat trials endorsed served as an 
independent variable in study analyses.  Previous research has shown that the WSAP task validly 
discriminates between socially anxious individuals and non-anxious controls (Beard & Amir, 
2009).  Furthermore, symptom severity is positively correlated with threat endorsement rates and 
negatively correlated with non-threat endorsement rates.  
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Dot Probe Task.  A modified version of the dot probe task was used to assess attention 
bias toward threatening faces relative to neutral and positive faces.  The stimuli and task were 
developed by Mogg and Bradley (1999); the measure consists of 128 stimulus faces, 2 from each 
of 64 different models.  Each model presents both a threatening or happy pose and a neutral 
pose.  Thus, there are 32 threatening faces and 32 happy faces, each matched with a neutral 
image of the same person.  Stimuli were presented in pairs, threat-neutral and happy-neutral, 
with one image on each side of the screen (e.g., threat on the right and neutral on the left).  Each 
pair was presented twice, with the location of each image reversed (e.g., threat on the left and 
neutral on the right).  Thus, there were 128 critical trials.  In addition, 32 filler trials consisting of 
neutral-neutral pairs were randomly interspersed throughout the task.  Trials were presented in a 
new random order for each participant.  Participants completed a practice run of 5 trials before 
completing the actual task.  
Participants completed the modified dot probe task on a desktop computer.  They were 
instructed to use the “#1” and “#2” buttons on the keyboard to provide their responses; these 
keys were marked with white labels.  An instruction screen appeared at the start of the task and 
the assessor reviewed it with participants.  First, a fixation a cross appeared on the screen for 500 
ms to direct the participant’s attention to the screen.  Second, a pair of faces (approximately 4.5 x 
7 cm each) was presented on the screen for 500 ms and a small asterisk appeared for 1100 
immediately afterwards, in place of one of the faces.  As quickly as possible, participants pressed 
the “#1” key to indicate that the dot was on the left or the “#2” to indicate that it was on the right.  
The probe appeared an equal number of times on each side of the screen.  The inter-trial interval 
varied randomly between 500 and 1250 ms.  
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Given that attention bias in social anxiety is typically specific to the processing of 
threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), the current study examined responses to threatening 
and neutral faces.  Threat bias scores were calculated by subtracting response time on trials in 
which a probe that replaces a neutral stimulus face from response time on trials in which a probe 
replaces a threat stimulus face.  A positive average value indicated a vigilant bias (preferential 
attention toward threatening faces relative to neutral faces) and a negative average value 
indicated an avoidance bias (preferential attention away from threatening faces toward neutral 
faces).  This score served as an independent variable in study analyses.  Previous research 
suggests that the task accurately discriminates between adults diagnosed with Social Phobia and 
controls (Mogg et al., 2004).  It also has been shown to discriminate between controls and adults 
with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & Bono, 1999). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  The 
STAI, a 20-item measure that assesses in-the-moment symptoms of general anxiety, was used to 
assess anxiety immediately following the speech task.  Participants rated their current anxiety 
using a 4-point Likert scale, (1= not at all, 2= somewhat, 3= moderately so, and 4= very much 
so).  The measure has adequate psychometric properties, with internal consistency coefficients 
ranging from .86 to .95 (Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983).  In the current study, the STAI-state 
showed excellent reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93.  
The Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D; Radloff, 1977).  The CES-
D is a 20-item measure of depression symptomology, including restless sleep, poor appetite, and 
feelings of loneliness.  Individuals are asked to rate how they have felt over the past week on a 4-
point Likert scale (0= rarely or none of the time, 1= some or little of the time, 2= moderately or 
much of the time, and 3= most or almost all the time).  Scores range from 0 to 60, with higher 
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scores indicating more, and more frequently experienced, depressive symptoms.  The measure is 
often used to identify individuals at risk for clinical depression and has good sensitivity and 
specificity and high internal consistency (Lewinsohn, Seeley, Roberts, & Allen, 1997).  It can 
also be used appropriately with racially diverse populations, with internal consistency 
coefficients ranging from .85 to .91 and similar to those found in the general population and 
patient samples (Roberts, 1980).  Depression scores were included a covariate in study analyses.  
In the current study, the CESD showed excellent reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .91.  
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1973).  The SUDS is a self-report 
face-valid scale that is used to assess current distress or anxiety.  SUDS ratings served as an 
index of situational anxiety; this rating score was included as a dependent variable in study 
analyses.  A SUDS of 0 represents the absence of any distress or anxiety, 50 represents moderate 
distress or anxiety, and 100 represents the most distress or anxiety imaginable.  SUDS ratings are 
commonly used during exposure therapy and emotion-focused therapy for trauma-related and 
anxiety disorders, as well as during assessment (e. g., during a behavioral avoidance task; see 
below) (Kim, Bae, & Chon Park, 2008; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966).   
Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT).  The BAT is based on a commonly-used standardized 
speech assessment protocol (Beidel et al., 1989) and involves the delivery of an impromptu 
speech.  The BAT is widely used in research, particularly in social anxiety treatment studies, 
where it serves as a measure of efficacy (Heimberg, 1998; Coles & Heimberg 2000).  Speech 
length, which has been shown to be a reliable measure of “escape” or behavioral avoidance 
(Beidel et al., 1989), was included as a dependent variable in study analyses.  Participants were 
asked to give a 10-minute speech on up to three chosen topics while they were videotaped.  
Participants spoke in front of the lab assessor and two other research team members.  Participants 
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were not forced or coerced to complete the task in any way and were allowed to discontinue 
speaking at any point.  Topics were intended to be challenging or controversial, so that they 
would elicit high anxiety.  Examples of topics included: capital punishment, abortion, and 
nuclear power.  Participants were given 5 minutes to take notes and prepare.  Participants were 
asked to give SUDS anxiety ratings prior to speaking, every 2 minutes while speaking, and at the 
end of speaking.  Audience members were instructed to display neutral facial expressions during 
the speech and were asked to privately rate the participant’s performance and perceived anxiety 
level, using a 0 to 10 Likert scale, after the speech. 
2.3 Procedure 
This project was approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).  The study was advertised via flyers and radio public service announcements.  Individuals 
interested in participating in the study contacted the lab via telephone or email.  A trained 
graduate student conducted the initial screening segment of a two-part assessment process via 
telephone to determine initial eligibility (i.e., no suicidal ideation, meets basic 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, passes brief initial diagnostic screening and rule-out process).  
Potentially eligible participants were scheduled for the second, in-person part of the assessment 
process (Time 1 visit) to confirm eligibility.  All assessments took place in a psychology 
laboratory on the 10th floor of the Urban Life building at Georgia State University.  During the 
in-person segment of the eligibility-ascertainment process, a trained graduate student 
administered the SCID.  Participants meeting DSM-IV criteria for social anxiety disorder as their 
primary diagnosis were enrolled in the study, assigned a study participant number, and scheduled 
for a Time 2 visit one week later (parking passes for that visit was provided when needed).  At 
Time 2, participants completed the self-report questionnaires, the dot-probe task, the WSAP, and 
26 
the BAT.  They also completed the STAI immediately following their impromptu speech (BAT). 
The order of administration for the dot-probe and WSAP was randomized for each participant to 
reduce the risk that confounds due to task order would impede interpretation of results.  All other 
tasks remained in a standard order.  Random task order was be determined by flipping a coin 
(heads = dot-probe first, tails = WSAP first) prior to the start of the assessment; the order was 
noted in the participant’s data.  At the end of Time 2, participants were compensated $50 and 
provided with referrals for psychotherapy and other resources (e.g., information about 
Toastmasters).  Figure 1 provides a flow chart of participation in the study. 
 
Figure 1: Participation flow chart 
 
2.4 Analyses and sample size 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the hypothesis that attention bias and 
interpretation bias would differentially predict symptom severity (measured by the LSAS-SR 
total fear and avoidance subscale scores), situational anxiety (measured by the highest SUDS 
Contacted lab & 
complete phone 
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discontinued  
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rating during the BAT), and behavioral avoidance (measured by BAT speech length).  Partial 
correlations were examined to further explore the distinct contributions of each predictor to 
variance in the outcome while all other independent variables were covaried.  
A sample size of 34 was determined (using GPower) to be sufficient to detect expected 
moderate effect sizes (.25) with a power of .80.  I expected to find similar effect sizes to those 
reported in the existing literature.  A meta-analysis of studies on attention bias and anxiety 
indicated an average effect size of d=.45, with a range of d= .23-.69 (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  
Effect sizes for interpretation bias and anxiety in previous literature range from d = .25 to 1.13 
(e.g., Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Stopa & Clark, 2000).  A review of 
cognitive bias modification and anxiety indicated an average effect size of d =.51, with a range 
of d =.35-.69 (Hakamata et al., 2010).  I used the smallest effect size reported in the previous 
literature in my power analysis to ensure a sufficient sample size.  
 
  
28 
3     RESULTS 
3.1 Data inspection and score calculation 
Analyses were conducted using the SPSS 21.0 program.  Data were first inspected for 
outliers and evaluated for fit between variable distributions and the assumptions of multivariate 
analysis, which they met satisfactorily (Cohen & Cohen, 2003).  Means and standard deviations 
of all variables are presented in Table 1.  Simple correlations were examined among all variables 
to determine appropriate covariates (see Table 2).   
Table 1: Means and standard deviations (N=34) 
 Mean SD 
LSASfear 51.029 19.457 
LSASavoid 49.353 18.627 
CESD 33.618 13.880 
ThreatEndorse (%) .681 .205 
BenignEndorse (%) .649 .213 
AttnBias 8.622 16.540 
STAI- State 59.876 11.872 
Peak SUDS 8.265 1.463 
Speech Length (in seconds) 347.765 213.145 
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Table 2: Zero-order correlations between variables (N=34) 
 
LSAS 
Fear 
LSAS 
Avoid 
CESD 
Threat 
Endorse 
Benign 
Endorse 
Attn 
Bias 
STAI-
State 
Peak 
SUDS 
Speech 
Length 
LSASfear - .956** .813** .498* -.513** -.052 .217 .019 .196 
LSASavoid - - .743** .448** -.496** -.051 .230 .022 .158 
CESD - - - .270 -.450** .044 .159 -.002 .184 
ThreatEndorse - - - - -.277 -.036 .236 .340* .159 
BenignEndorse - - - - - .108 -.584* -.206 .077 
AttnBias - - - - - - .121 .029 -.053 
STAI-State - - - - - - - .462** -.130 
Peak SUDS - - - - - - - - .232 
SpeechLength - - - - - - - - - 
Note.  * p < .05, ** p < .01 
3.1.1 Interpretation bias scores 
Data from trials with reaction times greater than 2 standard deviations above the 
participant’s mean reaction time were considered outliers and excluded from analyses.  Two 
scores were computed for each participant – threat endorsement and benign endorsement.  Threat 
endorsement scores were calculated by taking the sum of threatening word-sentence pairs 
identified as related and dividing by the total number of threatening word-sentence pairs, 
resulting in a percentage for each participant.  Benign endorsement scores were calculated in the 
same way using benign word-sentence pairs. 
3.1.2 Attention bias scores 
Data from trials with errors were excluded from analyses.  Reaction times less than 200 
ms and greater than two standard deviations above the participant’s mean reaction time were 
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considered outliers and excluded from analyses.  Attention bias scores were calculated by 
subtracting average reaction time to probes following neutral faces from average reaction time 
when problems follow threatening faces (MacLeod and Mathews, 1988).  Bias scores represent 
an average reaction time across trials, with positive scores indicating vigilance and negative 
scores indicating avoidance. 
3.2 Results of analyses  
A series of linear multiple regressions was conducted to test the hypotheses that 
interpretation bias (measured as percentages of threat endorsement and of benign endorsement) 
and attention bias (measured by the dot-probe score) would differentially predict symptom 
severity (measured by the LSAS fear and avoidance scales), situational social anxiety (measured 
by peak SUDS rating and the STAI-state) and behavioral avoidance (measured by speech length 
in seconds).  Depression was controlled for by including CESD scores as a covariate in all 
regressions.  Either symptom severity or situational anxiety (depending on the outcome variable) 
was also included as a covariate, so that results would more strongly reflect the type of anxiety 
being examined (i.e., state or trait).  
3.2.1 Symptom severity 
Two linear multiple regressions were conducted to test the hypothesis that interpretation 
bias and attention bias would be significantly related to symptom severity. Interpretation bias 
(threat endorsement and benign endorsement) and attention bias were the predictor variables and 
LSAS fear and LSAS avoidance were the outcome variables, with depression and situational 
anxiety included as covariates (see Tables 3 and 4).  For both fear and avoidance models, R2 
differed significantly from zero (F(6,25)=16.135, p<.01, R2=.795; F(6,25)=9.122, p<.01, 
R2=.686, respectively).  Two variables made significant independent contributions to the 
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variance; one was the CES-D score included as a covariate.  The second, as predicted, was the 
percentage of threatening word-sentence pairs endorsed.  These results suggest that a greater 
threat interpretation bias is related to greater symptom severity, while controlling for attention 
bias.  Contrary to study hypotheses, attention bias was not significantly related to fear or 
avoidance. 
Table 3: Multiple regression with variables predicting LSAS Fear scores (N=32)  
 B SE B β p 95% CI 
CESD .862 .151 .618 <.001 .550-1.173 
STAI-State .007 .199 .004 .974 -.403-.416 
Peak SUDS -3.143 1.666 -.220 .071 -6.573-.287 
AttnBias -.083 .110 -.070 .459 -.310-.144 
ThreatEndorse 36.298 9.982 .382 .001 15.738-56.857 
BenignEndorse -23.128 13.156 -.231 .091 -50.222-3.966 
Note.  R
2 
=.795, adjusted R
2
 =.745  
 
Table 4: Multiple regression with variables predicting LSAS avoidance scores (N=32) 
 B SE B β p 95% CI 
CESD .730 .177 .552 .000 .365-1.095 
STAI-State .059 .233 .038 .801 -.421-.540 
Peak SUDS -3.132 1.953 -.231 .121 -7.155-.891 
AttnBias -.084 .129 -.074 .523 -.350-.182 
ThreatEndorse 32.686 11.707 .363 .010 8.575-56.798 
BenignEndorse -21.946 15.429 -.231 .167 -53.722-9.829 
Note.  R
2 
=.686, adjusted R
2
 = .611 
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3.2.2 Situational anxiety 
Two linear multiple regressions were conducted to test the hypothesis that interpretation 
bias and attention bias would be significantly related to situational anxiety.  Two outcome 
variables were used to examine situational anxiety—highest or peak SUDs rating and the STAI-
state score (see Tables 5 and 6).  When CES-D score, symptom severity, and STAI-state score 
were covaried, the overall model for predicting peak SUDS was significant; R2 differed 
significantly from zero (F(6,25)=3.719, p<.01, R2= .472) and one variable made a significant 
independent contribution to the variance: the percentage of threat word-sentence pairs endorsed.  
When the STAI-state score was used as the outcome variable and peak SUDS was covaried 
along with CES-D score and symptom severity, R2 differed significantly from zero 
(F(6,25)=3.070, p=.022, R2=.424) and one variable made a significant independent contribution 
to the variance: the percentage of benign word-sentence pairs endorsed.  These results suggest 
that a weaker benign interpretation bias is related to greater general state anxiety following the 
speech task, while a stronger threat interpretation bias is related to greater anxiety during a 
socially stressful task, when controlling for attention bias.  Contrary to study hypotheses, 
attention bias was not significantly related to situational anxiety, as measured by peak SUDS or 
by general state anxiety following the speech task. 
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Table 5: Multiple regression with variables predictiing peak SUDS scores (N=32) 
 B SE B β p 95% CI 
CESD .015 .026 .152 .568 -.038-.067 
LSASfear -.040 .021 -.567 .071 -.083-.004 
STAI-State .024 .022 .204 .286 -.021-.069 
AttnBias -.007 .012 -.088 .561 -.033-.018 
ThreatEndorse 3.539 1.192 .532 .007 1.083-5.995 
BenignEndorse -2.906 1.455 -.414 .057 -5.902-.091 
Note.  R
2 
=.472, adjusted R
2
 = .345 
 
Table 6: Multiple regression with variables predicting STAI-State scores (N=32) 
 B SE B β p 95% CI 
CESD -.097 .230 -.116 .677 -.570-.376 
LSASfear .007 .201 .011 .974 -.407-.421 
Peak SUDS 1.907 1.748 .223 .286 -1.693-5.507 
Tbias .112 .110 .158 .315 -.114-.338 
ThreatEndorse 2.770 12.392 .049 .825 -22.752-28.292 
BenignEndorse -31.605 12.508 -.525 .018 -57.366—5.844 
Note.  R
2 
=.424, adjusted R
2
 =.286  
3.2.3 Behavioral avoidance 
A linear multiple regression was conducted to examine the hypothesis that both 
interpretation bias and attention bias would be significantly related to behavioral avoidance, 
which was measured by speech length in seconds (see Table 7).  When CES-D score was 
covaried, the overall model for predicting speech length was not significant (F(5,28)=.596, 
p=.703, R2=.096).  The results suggest that, contrary to study hypotheses, neither interpretation 
bias nor attention bias are significantly related to behavioral avoidance. 
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Table 7: Multiple regression with variables predicting speech length (N=32) 
 B SE B β p 95% CI 
CESD 3.902 3.121 .254 .221 -2.480-10.285 
AttnBias -1.093 2.309 -.085 .639 -5.814-3.629 
ThreatEndorse 145.801 192.809 .140 .456 -248.538-540.140 
BenignEndorse 232.930 202.180 .232 .259 -180.575-646.435 
Note.  Speech length measured in seconds. Overall model was not significant  
3.2.4 Exploratory Analyses  
A series of post-hoc regression analyses were conducted to examine alternative indices of 
constructs of interest. Audience ratings of participants’ speech quality and how anxious the 
speakers looked were used as measures of behavior and included as outcome variables.  In 
addition, both attention bias towards positive faces and an attention bias variability index were 
used as measures of attention bias and included as independent variables.   
Audience ratings of speech quality and anxiety appearance: When completing the BAT, 
participants were rated by 2-3 audience members on how good the talk was and how anxious the 
speaker was using a 0 to 10 Likert scale. Mean ratings across audience members were calculated 
to form a speech quality score and anxious appearance score for each participant. These variables 
served as markers of behavior.  
Attention bias towards positive faces: Positive attention bias scores were calculated by 
subtracting average reaction time to probes following neutral faces from average reaction time 
when probes follow positive faces. Bias scores represent an average reaction time across trials, 
with positive scores indicating vigilance and negative scores indicating avoidance. 
Attention bias variability index: An attention bias variability (ABV) index represents 
intrasession variability as a marker of attentional control impairment and inconsistency of 
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response to threatening stimuli, and has been previously validated as an index of attention bias 
(Iacoviello et al., 2014). ABV index scores were calculated by first dividing dot-probe trials into 
bins of 20 sequential trials and then calculating threat bias scores for each bin. The standard 
deviation of the threat bias scores was calculated across all bins and divided by the individual’s 
mean RT to all critical trials (threat-neutral pair trials) (Price et al., 2014) to determine the ABV.  
The first series of exploratory regression analyses were conducted to examine whether 
interpretation bias (measured by threat endorsement and benign endorsement scores) and 
attention bias (measured by threat bias scores)would be significantly related to behavior 
(measured by speech quality and anxious appearance). The overall model predicting audience 
ratings of speech quality was not significant (F(5,27)= 1.15, p= .364, R2=.207). In addition, the 
overall model predicting audience ratings of anxious appearance was not significant (F(5,27)= 
1.21, p= .378, R2=.203).  
The second series of regression analyses were conducted to examine whether attention 
bias towards positive faces (instead of attention bias towards threatening faces) would be 
significantly related to symptom severity (measured by the LSAS fear and avoidance scales), 
situational social anxiety (measured by peak SUDS rating and the STAI-state) and behavioral 
avoidance (measured by speech length in seconds, audience ratings of speech performance, and 
audience ratings of anxious appearance), when interpretation bias was also included as an 
independent variable.  Depression was controlled for by including CESD scores as a covariate in 
all regressions. When CESD score and interpretation bias scores were controlled for, positive 
attention bias was not significantly related to symptom severity (LSAS fear and avoidance:β= -
.164, t(27)= -1.502, p= .148;β= .-.139, t(27)= -1.012, p= .323) or situational anxiety (peak 
SUDS and STAI-state:β= -.094, t(29)= -.471, p= .642;β= -.319, t(27)= -1.931, p= .067).  In 
36 
addition, the overall models predicting behavioral outcomes were not significant; speech length 
(F(5,29)=1.030, p=.423, R2=.177), speech quality (F(5,26)= 1.368, p=.276, R2=.246), and 
anxious appearance (F(5,26)= 1.234, p=.338, R2=.227). These results are consistent with the 
primary results of the study, which used threat bias scores as an index of attention bias. 
The final series of exploratory of regression analyses were conducted to examine whether 
attention bias variability (instead of threat bias) would be significantly related to symptom 
severity (measured by the LSAS fear and avoidance scales), situational social anxiety (measured 
by peak SUDS rating and the STAI-state) and behavioral avoidance (measured by speech length 
in seconds, speech quality, and anxious appearance), when interpretation bias was also included 
as an independent.  Depression was controlled for by including CESD scores as a covariate in all 
regressions.  When CESD score and interpretation bias scores were controlled for, ABV was not 
significantly related to symptom severity (LSAS fear and avoidance:β= .089, t(28)= .867, p= 
.396;β= .120, t(28)= .957, p= .349) or situational anxiety (peak SUDS and STAI-state:β= .256, 
t(28)= .1.427, p= .166;β= .093, t(28)= .536, p= .597).  In addition, the overall models predicting 
behavioral outcomes were not significant; speech length (F(5,30)=.627, p=.681, R2=.111), 
speech quality (F(5,27)= .653, p=.662, R2=.129), and anxious appearance (F(5,27)= 1.155, 
p=.362, R2=.208). These results are consistent with the primary results of the study, which used 
threat bias scores as an index of attention bias. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
The current study examined the associations of both interpretation bias and attention bias 
with symptom severity, situational social anxiety, and behavioral avoidance in adults with social 
phobia.  Results indicated that there were distinct associations between the two types of biases 
and social anxiety, as indexed by some, but not all measures.  A clear link was found between 
interpretation bias and social anxiety but, contrary to expectations, not between attention bias 
and social anxiety.  More specifically, interpretation bias was related to both symptom severity 
(LSAS fear and avoidance) and situational anxiety (SUDS ratings and STAI-state), while 
attention bias was not significantly associated with any measure of anxiety.  In addition, neither 
interpretation nor attention biases were related to behavioral avoidance, operationalized as 
speech length during an impromptu speech task. 
In the following sections, I examine more closely both the significant findings with 
regard to interpretation biases and the null findings for attention biases.  In doing so, I attempt to 
integrate the present results into both the social anxiety and the broader anxiety literatures.  I also 
suggest theoretical models that provide a context for understanding and interpreting the observed 
pattern of findings.  I conclude by discussing limitations of the current study and suggesting 
future directions for research on cognitive biases and social anxiety.  
4.1 Interpretation bias and anxiety 
The key finding of the current study is a pattern of significant and distinct associations 
between interpretation bias and both symptom severity and situational anxiety.  Specifically, 
greater endorsement of threat word-sentence pairs, or a threat bias, was significantly related to 
both self-reported fear and avoidance symptomology, as well as to peak anxiety while giving a 
speech.  In addition, less endorsement of benign sentence-word pairs, or a lack of a benign bias, 
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was significantly related to self-reported state anxiety immediately after giving a speech.  
In the current study, symptomology was operationalized as self-reported trait social 
anxiety and general behavioral avoidance.  Scores from the LSAS fear and avoidance scales, 
which have been used to measure social anxiety over time (Heimberg, 1999) and to distinguish 
between clinical and sub-clinical levels of social anxiety (Mennin, 2002), served as the basis for 
the operational definition of trait social anxiety.  The LSAS has added advantages in that it has 
been widely used to capture general social anxiety in research contexts and often serves as an 
outcome measure in treatment studies (Heimberg 1999).   To capture state or situational social 
anxiety, I used a peak SUDS rating during an impromptu speech and the STAI-state scale, which 
participants completed immediately after the speech.  These measures provided estimates of state 
anxiety.  
Observed associations between interpretation biases and anxiety indices differed across 
measures that capture anxiety over varying time courses (trait vs. state).  The the present results 
suggest that whereas an interpretation bias for threat relates both to enduring trait anxiety and to 
anxiety experienced transiently (in the moment), failure to produce benign interpretations is 
related more narrowly to anxiety in the moment.  
This pattern is consistent with previous research that has linked clinical social anxiety 
with an online and offline negative interpretation bias (e.g., Amir & Bomyea, 2010) as well as a 
lack of an online benign bias (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), even using the same WSAP task 
(Amir et al., 2012).  It is also consistent with findings from Huppert and colleagues (2007), 
which indicated a negative interpretation bias in socially phobic and non-socially phobic anxious 
individuals (at both high and low social anxiety levels), but a lack of a positive bias only in those 
with high levels of social anxiety.  These biases were present at both the interpretation generation 
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phase (i.e., providing more negative interpretations and less non-threatening ones) and the 
interpretation selection phase (i.e., endorsing more negative interpretations and less non-
threatening ones).  The authors interpreted these findings, along with previous studies, as support 
for a time course of processing that may shift from a presence of chronic threat bias to a lack of 
an online benign bias and presence of a threat bias to the presence of a negative appraisal of the 
self. The current findings, in which negative interpretation relates to characteristic and situational 
social anxiety and the lack of benign interpretation relates to situational anxiety, seem consistent 
with this theory. The current study extends prior work by suggesting that lack of benign bias is 
linked to state, but not to trait, anxiety in a diagnosed socially anxious sample.   
The current study’s evidence of specific associations between social anxiety and each 
type of interpretation bias is consistent with previous research findings suggesting that social 
anxiety involves both a presence of threat bias and a lack of benign bias (e.g., Amir, Prouvost, & 
Kuckertz, 2012; Beard & Amir, 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000).  In a non-clinical sample, 
Beard and Amir (2009) found that high socially anxious individuals endorsed more social threat 
interpretations and fewer benign interpretations than non-anxious controls, using the WSAP task 
administered in the present study.  Furthermore, in Beard and Amir’s (2009) study, although 
socially anxious individuals endorsed threatening interpretation and non-threatening 
interpretations at equal rates (consistent with the present study’s findings), the speeds at which 
they endorsed each type of interpretation correlated positively and negatively with social anxiety, 
respectively.  
The comparable endorsement rates for threatening and benign interpretations found in the 
current and Beard and Amir (2009) studies, but not in other research (e.g., Amin et al., 1998; 
Stopa & Clark, 2000) may, at least in part, reflect differences in methodology.  For example, in 
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the WSAP task used in both the present study and Beard and Amir’s (2009) work, participants 
decide only whether a word and sentence are related. They do not, as participants have been 
asked to do in related research, choose whether one word (e.g., "bored") is more closely related 
to a sentence (e.g., "A person yawns during your speech") than another (e.g., "tired").  As such, 
one method allows for the measurement of endorsement of both negative and benign 
interpretations, while the other only allows for the measurement of preference of one over the 
other. Therefore, in studies that utilize measurement of preference, it would be impossible to 
obtain equal endorsement rates because only one option (negative or neutral) can be selected.  
Regardless, however, of the role that study methodology plays in shaping the pattern of 
associations observed, the emergence of distinct relationships between anxiety and threat and 
benign biases suggests, as Beard and Amir (2009) noted, that there is value in treating these bias 
types as separate constructs, which other researchers have done in related studies (Huppert, Foa, 
Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003).  The current findings lend credence to this assertion. 
Thus, the current findings suggest that cultivation of benign biases may be just as 
important in efforts to decrease anxiety, particularly anxiety in the moment, as the reduction of 
threat biases, which is more commonly a focus of intervention.  Indeed, cognitive bias 
modification studies that have measured state and/or trait anxiety have shown that inducing a 
benign interpretation bias results in reduced trait anxiety (measured by the STAI-trait) in anxious 
individuals (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007).  Similarly, induction of a benign 
interpretation bias has been linked to decreases in state anxiety (measured by the STAI-state) in a 
non-clinical community sample adults (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  
Finally, in addition to lending support to prior findings, the current study advances the 
literature by suggesting, consistent with cognitive theories, that affect, particularly anxiety, is an 
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influential force in shaping higher level cognitive processes, such as interpretation of 
information.  For example, cognitive models suggest that people sampled from the general 
population tend to interpret self-relevant information as more positive than it may objectively be 
(Alicke et al., 1995).  Put simply, they have positive interpretation biases, which are likely 
informed by their beliefs or expectations about the world around them (Dagmar Stahlberg, 
1999).  This bias pattern stands in contrast to that observed in socially anxious individuals who 
appear to be primed, due to long-standing or pre-existing fears of negative evaluation, to 
interpret self-relevant information as negative rather than as positive or benign. In other words, 
socially anxious individuals seem to be “wired” with a negative interpretation bias that their non-
anxious peers do not have (e.g., Amir & Bomyea, 2010).  
Thus, not only do socially anxious individuals typically default to negative interpretations 
of social stimuli in general, but also, under stressful situations (when state anxiety is high), such 
negative interpretations may be especially accessible for them. The current study’s findings are 
consistent with this assertion because endorsement of negative interpretations was positively 
related to situational anxiety and endorsement of benign interpretations was inversely (or 
negatively) related to situational anxiety. Further, people with social anxiety may preferentially 
select such interpretations, even when they are able to identify or generate appropriate benign or 
positive alternatives.  Indeed, previous studies have found socially anxious individuals to endorse 
negative interpretations for ambiguous social scenarios as more readily accessible and more 
believable, even when neutral and positive interpretations were made available to them (Amin, 
Foa, & Coles, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 2000).   
In sum, the current findings regarding interpretation bias are consistent with two key 
points.  First, they suggest that individuals with social phobia may be able to generate more non-
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threatening interpretations as easily as they do threatening interpretations; however, they are less 
likely to select them to guide their behavior during anxiety-provoking situations.  Second, these 
findings are consistent with predictions based on theories about the influence of affect on social 
information processing and suggest that enduring and situational manifestations of anxiety 
exercise particular influences over information processing in socially anxious individuals. 
4.2 Attention bias and anxiety 
The failure to detect a significant relationship between attention bias and symptom 
severity and situational anxiety in a clinical sample is unexpected, though not unprecedented.  
While many studies have yielded findings that indicate the presence of a significant attention 
bias either towards or away from threatening stimuli in socially anxious individuals (e.g., Bar-
Haim et al., 2007; Spasori & Rapee, 2007; Chen et al., 2002), a few earlier studies have not 
found significant attention biases, particularly in non-clinical samples (Bradley et al., 1997; 
Pineles & Mineka, 2005).  Given that the current study used a clinical sample and administered a 
facial dot-probe task used in much of the prior research, it is notable that no significant 
associations with anxiety symptoms or avoidance were evident.  This may lend credence to 
Schultz and Heimberg’s (2008) assertion that socially anxious individuals direct attention to both 
external cues (consistent with a vigilant stance) and internal cues (consistent with an avoidant 
stance) throughout a social situation, an idea that was not possible to detect using the current 
study’s methodology but clearly warrants closer examination.  
Indeed, a hypervigilance-avoidance hypothesis has been proposed in previous work (e.g., 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), which states that 
attentional bias is a dynamic process, rather than a static response pattern.  According to this 
hypothesis, people are first vigilant to external threat cues.  They then direct attention away from 
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the threat to avoid detailed processing and to minimize anxiety.  One study tested this hypothesis 
by tracking eye movements during presentation of paired threatening and neutral cues and found 
that individuals with higher levels of social anxiety were faster to attend to threat cues but looked 
at them more briefly than did individuals with lower levels of social anxiety.  The authors 
interpreted these results as consistent with a vigilant-avoidant pattern of bias (Garner, Mogg, & 
Bradley, 2006).  Although some participants’ data may have been consistent with this idea, the 
model did not fit all of the participants’ data (i.e., some had avoidant scores).  Thus, it may be 
that the course of attention to external and internal cues varies amongst individuals with social 
anxiety.  
The null attention bias findings in the current study may also reflect within-sample 
variability in attention bias scores, which ranged from -25.50 to 42.53.  Given that some 
participants showed avoidant biases (negative bias scores) and others showed hypervigilant 
biases (positive bias scores), the present sample could comprise members of both of Calamaras 
and colleagues’ (2012) proposed attentional subtypes for socially anxious individuals.  Thus, the 
decision in the present study to treat attention bias scores as varying along a single continuum 
may have obscured distinct relations between attention bias and social anxiety that might be 
evident for each subtype.  For example, among attentionally vigilant people with social anxiety, 
associations between bias scores and symptom measures might emerge only for indices of fear, 
while among attentionally avoidant people, such associations might emerge only for indices of 
behavioral avoidance.  
To date, no published study has examined differential associations between bias scores 
for individuals who display different attention bias subtypes and social anxiety symptomology.  
Price and colleagues (2011) found no significant differences between subtypes in total LSAS 
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scores; however, they did not look at differences between subtypes on fear and avoidance 
subscale scores, nor did they conduct correlational analyses within subtype groups.  Although the 
current study was inadequately powered to examine subtype groups separately, inspection of 
individual threat bias scores indicated that 10 of the 34 participants had negative scores, 
suggesting an avoidant bias.  Future research using larger samples would allow for analyses in 
which participants are grouped based on bias type.  
4.3 Behavioral avoidance 
The absence of significant associations between behavioral avoidance during an 
impromptu speech and both interpretation and attention biases was unexpected.  One possible 
explanation is that a single “snapshot” of avoidance, even under circumstances—like the BAT—
that are likely to elicit such behavior, may be inadequate to elicit or capture such associations, if 
they are indeed present.  Rather than engaging in behavioral avoidance in every anxiety-
provoking situation, socially anxious individuals may, on average, avoid situations more often 
than non-anxious individuals.  Therefore it may be that research focused on patterns of 
avoidance over time (e.g., if people continuously interpret party environments negatively, they 
will develop a pattern of avoiding parties) would be more likely to yield evidence of associations 
with cognitive biases.  
 Alternatively, a few methodological issues may have contributed to the null 
findings with regard to behavioral avoidance.  First, a single-variable measurement of behavioral 
avoidance, in this case speech length, may not be adequate to capture the hypothesized 
associations.  Instead, cognitive biases may be related to other, and perhaps more subtle, 
behavioral manifestations of avoidance such as lack of eye contact or speaking speed.  For 
example, if a socially anxious individual interprets an audience member’s yawn as boredom 
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rather than tiredness, she may cut her talk short.  Alternatively, someone who interprets the 
audience as disapproving may attempt to explain himself and end up rambling or fumbling with 
his words.  Indeed, previous research has shown that socially anxious individuals not only escape 
social situations sooner than non-anxious individuals but also engage in other forms of avoidance 
such as engaging in less eye contact, speaking faster or skipping material (e.g., Baker & 
Edelmann, 2002; Voncken & Bögels, 2008) compared to non-anxious controls.  Future research 
would benefit from treating behavioral avoidance as a multifaceted construct that may have 
complex and varied relationships with cognitive processes.  
Further, the chosen behavioral avoidance task version may not have optimally elicited 
behavioral avoidance.  In the current study, all participants completed the same impromptu 
speech task and were provided with the same topics to choose from.  Although the task seemed 
likely to be personally relevant for each participant (all participants endorsed public speaking 
fears), previous research recommends personalized stimulus situations for BATs (e.g., a 
conversation, presenting material at a meeting) (Chiauzzi, Heimberg, Becker, & Gansler, 1985), 
which may provide a more relevant or accurate observation of the individual’s behavioral 
repertoire.  For example, Heimberg and colleagues (1993) found that individuals who had 
received cognitive behavioral group therapy for social phobia received lower anxiety ratings and 
better performance ratings by independent judges on an individually-tailored behavioral test 
compared to those who received educational-supportive therapy.  They also reported less anxiety 
during the behavioral test after treatment.  
Finally, it may have been important to consider self-focused negative interpretations 
when examining associations between interpretation biases and behavioral outcome.  Indeed, 
previous research has posited that the reduction of negative self-statements may play a role in 
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behavior change (Kendall & Hollon, 1981).  Therefore, a self-specific negative interpretation 
(e.g., “I look shaky and nervous”) versus an environment- focused negative interpretation (e.g., 
“That person looks bored”) may be more relevant to behavioral avoidance.  
Indeed, research has shown that socially anxious individuals endorse more negative self-
statements than non-socially anxious individuals and that negative self-statement endorsement is 
significantly correlated to anxiety levels and performance skill during a social interaction task 
(Glass et al., 1982).  Thus, it is likely that a negative self-bias in a given situation will be more 
tightly linked to behavior than will a general negative interpretation bias.  In the current study, 
interpretation bias was measured by examining the number of threat-sentences pair endorsed for 
a variety of ambiguous situations (e.g., “You share an idea with someone”), rather than 
examining the number of negative self-statements endorsed.  Similarly, it may be that general 
trait negative interpretations (e.g., measured in general or not specifically during an anxiety 
provoking situation) may not be directly related to avoidant behavior; instead behavior may be 
more closely related to specific negative interpretations exhibited in the moment.  The current 
study measured interpretation bias prior to the impromptu task.  
4.4 Limitations and strengths of the present study 
The current study is not without limitations.  First, the sample was small, primarily 
female, and relatively young (mean age =23).  Results of a power analysis, which determined 
that a sample of 34 should be sufficient to detect expected effect sizes, suggest that the small 
number of participants is not necessarily problematic, although it may have been a contributing 
factor to the null behavioral findings.  The homogeneity of the sample limits generalizability of 
findings to the broader social phobic population.  Although this study provides an important 
initial examination of both interpretation bias and attention bias and their distinct relations to 
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behavior, it should be replicated, particularly in light of the small and somewhat homogenous 
sample.  
Second, the current study utilized cross-sectional data from a single laboratory 
assessment.  Therefore, consistency of the associations found could not be determined (i.e., do 
these relational patterns exist at any given moment or do they change).  Future research that 
includes longitudinal methodology would be beneficial in order to examine the reliability of 
relational patterns of interest over time. 
Despite these limitations, this study has notable strengths, including being the first to 
examine separately the relations between interpretation bias and attention bias and behavior in a 
clinically socially anxious sample.  The findings suggest that interpretation bias, but not attention 
bias, is related to both enduring and situational anxiety in social phobia. Future research is 
needed to better understand in what ways interpretation bias relates to both social anxiety and 
behavior.  
4.5 Future directions 
The current study’s findings (both significant and null) provide a foundation for several 
avenues of future research.  First, the pattern of significant associations between interpretation 
bias (both threat and lack of benign bias) and social anxiety (trait versus state) is informative 
because they suggest that when considering treatments for social anxiety, not only it is important 
to challenge and reduce negative biases, but it is also useful to teach skills for producing 
alternative benign interpretations, particularly in stressful moments.  Indeed, results of cognitive 
bias modification studies for social anxiety suggest that increasing familiarity with and access to 
benign interpretations can help reduce anxiety symptoms (Beard & Amir, 2008).   
There may thus be value, as Beard and Amir (2009) propose, in extending current bias 
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modification paradigms to include training in the generation and selection of benign 
interpretations, particularly during anxiety-provoking social situations.  One study found 
cognitive bias modification that involved increasing benign interpretations to be superior to 
computerized cognitive behavior therapy at maintaining a positive cognitive bias during a high 
mental load task (unscrambling socially relevant sentences while remembering a six digit 
number), in individuals with high social anxiety (Bowler et al., 2012).  Therefore, further 
exploration of potential benefits associated with including benign interpretation training during 
exposure might be one avenue for future treatment work.  For example, having an individual 
practice producing benign interpretations (e.g., “That person is checking his phone because he 
got an important text, not because I am giving a bad speech”) while in a stressful situation could 
potentially enhance exposure treatment outcomes.  
Currently, the literature on cognitive behavioral therapy suggests that the addition of 
cognitive treatment techniques, such as restructuring, do not necessarily have any added value 
towards enhancing outcomes beyond that which exposure provides (e.g., Emmelkamp, Mersch, 
Vissia, & van der Helm, 1985; Feske & Chambless, 1995; Longmore & Worrell, 2007).   
However, most cognitive components of therapy focus on challenging or reducing negative 
cognitions prior to exposure; rarely do they focus on generating benign interpretations during 
exposure.  Further, therapists typically spend little time (e.g., one or two sessions) on these 
techniques (Longmore, 2007).  
It may be that these cognitive components seem are unnecessary because they are not 
explicitly practiced during exposure, which research has identified as a key mechanism of 
change in CBT for anxiety (Nortje, Posthumus, & Moller, 2008).  It may also be that brief 
cognitive training is inadequate to affect long-standing negative beliefs (Longmore, 2007).  The 
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present findings, however, add to a growing literature, which suggests instead that focusing on 
enhancing exposure sessions with on-line benign interpretation training could actually render 
treatment more effective.   
Additional exposure-enhancing benefits could accrue from focusing on benign 
interpretation training under stress to the point of automaticity prior to exposure (i.e., 
computerized training with the knowledge of exposure immediately afterwards), so that 
individuals do not resort to old tendencies when faced with stressful cues.  Indeed, exposure may 
be more effective when combined with benign interpretation training because anxious 
individuals treated with this combination will not only learn that they can tolerate their anxiety, 
but they may also be more likely to have corrective or positive experiences during exposure due 
to more accessible benign or positive thoughts (e.g., “That went well” vs. “I guess I was able to 
do that this time”).  Not only might this combination be more reinforcing than exposure alone, 
but it could also lead clients to require fewer exposure sessions to achieve symptom reduction or 
result in longer-lasting treatment gains (e.g., relapse prevention).  This is one theory that may 
warrant future research.  
 Second, the current findings support further examination of interpretation bias and 
its associations with symptomology (both subjectively-reported anxiety levels and behavior), 
with particular emphasis on the temporal contexts in which interpretation biases may arise.  
Therefore, in order to further elucidate the patterns of associations found in the current study, it 
would be beneficial for future research to examine individually generated, on-line interpretations 
in socially anxious individuals (e.g., asking participants how they are interpreting audience 
members’ behaviors while they giving a speech). It may also be worthwhile for future research to 
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include measures of interpretation that are not social anxiety specific (e.g., other anxiety specific 
situations to interpret) as well as examine these relations in other anxiety disorders.  
Finally, given the unexpected null findings in the current study and the inconsistencies in 
the current literature regarding associations between attention bias and both anxiety and 
behavior, a more thorough and detailed understanding of attention bias patterns in social anxiety 
is needed.  One direction for future research may be to include eye-tracking methodology to 
measure attention bias over the course of a task (e.g., facial dot-probe) or social situation (e.g., 
speech task).  Future research may also benefit from utilizing BATs that may yield more valid 
measures of behavioral avoidance.  Such BATs might be individually tailored (e.g., conversation 
versus speech) or might include more indices of avoidance (e.g., eye contact, speech speed).  
4.6 Conclusions 
 The current study is the first to our knowledge to have examined the independent 
associations between interpretation bias and attention bias and social anxiety symptomology, 
situational anxiety, and behavioral avoidance in a sample of adults with social phobia.  Key 
findings revealed significant associations between negative interpretation bias and both trait and 
state social anxiety and a significant relationship between lack of benign interpretation bias and 
state anxiety.  There were no significant associations between attention bias and anxiety or 
behavioral avoidance.  The findings are consistent with both social anxiety and cognitive 
processing theories and contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of benign or 
positive interpretation bias in social phobia.  They also suggest distinct links of negative and 
positive interpretation bias to both state and trait anxiety. Examining the contribution of online 
benign interpretation training to treatment programs for social anxiety (e.g., cognitive bias 
modification, exposure therapy) in future research may be warranted.  
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APPENDIX A 
LSAS-SR  
 
Please read each situation carefully and provide an answer to each column for that situation. The first 
column refers to how anxious or fearful you feel in the situation. The second refers to how often you 
avoid the situation. If you come across a situation that you ordinarily do not experience, we ask that you 
imagine "what if you were faced with that situation," and then, rate the degree to which you would fear 
this hypothetical situation and how often you would tend to avoid it. Please base your ratings on the way 
that the situations have affected you in the last week.  
 
  Fear or 
Anxiety 
 
0 = None 
1 = Mild 
2 = Moderate 
3 = Severe 
Avoidance 
 
0 = Never (0%) 
1 = Occasionally (1-33%) 
2 = Often (33-67%) 
3 = Usually (67-100%) 
1. Telephoning in public (P)   
2. Participating in small groups (P)   
3. Eating in public places (P)   
4. Drinking with others in public places (P)   
5. Talking to people in authority (S)   
6. Acting, performing or giving a talk in front 
of an audience (P) 
  
7. Going to a party (S)   
8. Working while being observed (P)   
9. Writing while being observed (P)   
10. Calling someone you don’t know very well 
(S) 
  
11. Talking with people you don’t know very 
well (S) 
  
12. Meeting strangers (S)   
13. Urinating n a public bathroom (P)   
14. Entering a room when others are already   
68 
seated (P) 
15. Being the center of attention (S)   
16. Speaking up at a meeting (P)   
17. Taking a test (P)   
18. Expressing a disagreement or disapproval to 
people you don’t know very well (S) 
  
19. Looking at people you don’t know very well 
in the eyes (S) 
  
20. Giving a report to a group (P)   
21. Trying to pick up someone (P)   
22. Returning goods to a store (S)   
23. Giving a party (S)   
24. Resisting a high pressure salesperson (S)   
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Appendix B 
 
Sample items of the STAI-State:  
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Appendix C 
 
